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INTRODUCTION 
The study of rhetoric in economics has blossomed in recent years under the leadership of 
McCloskey (1983, 1986, 1994). She has encouraged a consciousness of the language used to 
persuade, and of the difference between official and unofficial discourse. Thus, in their 
official discourse, economists use a particular formal language to express ideas. But, 
McCloskey argues, ideas are formed and conveyed through an unofficial discourse which is 
informal. This puts in a different light the difference which Blaug (1980; 1992) had identified 
between the methodology which economists profess and that which they practise. While 
Blaug chastises economists for not living up to their professed methodology, McCloskey 
notes the difference and encourages economists to explore their unofficial discourse. 
The significance of McCloskey’s work is that it demonstrates the positive role of rhetoric. In 
English, the term ‘rhetoric’ conventionally implies the descriptor ‘empty’. The official 
discourse is conventionally regarded as the only admissible discourse, with anything else 
falling short of the prescribed formalist standards; the logic of the official discourse is 
sufficient to convey an argument, which can be judged on its own terms. But McCloskey 
shows that the formal discourse is only one type of rhetoric, and that economists routinely 
employ other forms (often in the guise of formal rhetoric, for example appeal to authority). 
This implies that, far from being a supplement to formal discourse, rhetoric is inherent in any 
discourse and is thus at the heart of economics. 
For a subject which is built on the concept of economic man, a being who is capable of full 
rationality based on full information, the idea that rhetoric is inherent to economic argument 
is uncomfortable. If economists do not, or, worse, cannot, conduct arguments in formally-
rational terms, what does this imply about their subject matter? The question of the role of 
rhetoric gets to the heart of the subject and our capacity to develop knowledge about it. 
It is the purpose of this chapter to consider the relationship between rationality and rhetoric. 
We will focus on two of the greatest economists, Smith and Keynes, both of whom addressed 
epistemological questions and both of whom recognised the significance of rhetoric. We start 
by considering their epistemology and what that implied for the role of rhetoric. We then 
proceed to consider what they had to say about the appropriate style of rhetoric. Two 
particular issues are then addressed: the role of analogy, and the role of rationalisation, as 
opposed to rationality, in economics. 
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RHETORIC 
Both Smith and Keynes were greatly influenced in their epistemology by David Hume. While 
it was Smith (1762-63) who was the better-versed in the principles of rhetoric, it was Hume’s 
(1739-40, 1748) philosophy which first demonstrated the significance of rhetoric. We 
therefore start by considering Hume. 
In France and England, Descartes, Locke and Berkeley had developed the sceptical view that 
existence could not be demonstrated on the basis of observation. This scepticism underpinned 
the development of rationalism, whereby deductive systems of thought were built on axioms. 
Thus the deductivism of the Church founded on dogma was replaced by deductivism based 
on axioms. Hume picked up the sceptical argument, and took it furthest by demonstrating the 
limitations on rational argument other than within closed formal systems. But, rather than 
destroying the basis for empirical science, Hume saw himself as clearing the way for science 
(see Luthe, 1984). The context in which Hume formed his ideas was the Scottish 
Enlightenment. The political, cultural, religious and economic changes in Scotland since the 
sixteenth century had encouraged a metaphysical habit of thought when addressing the many 
pressing practical questions (see Sutherland, 1982). The philosophical tradition included the 
Scottish common sense approach, which allowed for belief in existence as a starting-point of 
argument. 
While many saw Hume as being in opposition to common sense philosophy, in fact he 
intertwined it with his rational scepticism to provide a workable system of thought. This can 
only be understood by referring to Hume’s ontology. In common with other figures of the 
Scottish Enlightenment, Hume saw the development of a science of human nature as being 
central, and prior to all other sciences and mathematics. He understood human nature as 
operating according to common principles which reflected the social nature of human nature, 
but manifesting itself in different behaviour in different contexts. The importance of context 
required that human nature be analysed by means of historical analysis.  
Because Hume’s scepticism had suggested that reason did not provide an adequate basis for 
science (since it could not demonstrate existence), nor could it provide an adequate basis for 
action. The deficiency was made up by other human faculties which were necessary to human 
society. These faculties he variously termed imagination, passion, sentiment, convention and 
judgement. It was these faculties which generated the belief in existence which underpinned 
reason and thus science. 
Hume’s system of thought thus implies a role for rhetoric as a means of conveying sentiment 
along with reason. Hume’s system further suggests that reason is secondary, since it cannot 
alone provide a basis for science; it cannot demonstrate causal forces. It is sensations, 
combined with the belief in existence, which generate the idea of cause. But since we cannot 
identify true causal processes, the idea of cause itself is insufficient; this was Hume’s problem 
of induction. Knowledge should thus be understood as an open system, since the true causal 
processes were always capable of generating surprising events. 
This was the set of ideas which influenced Smith (1795, 1759) in his philosophy of science 
and theory of human nature (see Raphael, 1977). Smith developed a psychological theory of 
the development of science as being motivated by the sense of wonder, and by the aesthetic 
pleasure achieved by incorporating new observations within a system of familiar, connecting 
principles. Science developed when surprising events required a change in the theoretical 
system to explain them. But there was no presumption that any theory was true because, as 
Hume had argued, there is no mechanism for demonstrating the truth of a theory. A major 
element in the success or otherwise of a new theoretical development was the rhetoric by 
which the new development was communicated. 
Before Smith developed these theories, he presented a set of lectures on rhetoric, in 
Edinburgh, and then at the University of Glasgow, which were subsequently published from 
student notes (Smith, 1762-63). In these lectures, Smith developed a system of rhetoric as a 
means of communication, of which persuasion was a part. This represented a departure from 
the study of rhetoric as artifical systems of logic or in terms of literary style, as was 
conventional at the time. Smith’s theory can thus be understood as an adjunct to his theory of 
knowledge. As Howell (1975, 21) puts it, Smith saw rhetoric ‘not only as the theoretical 
instrument for the communication of ideas ... but also as the study of the structure and 
function of all discourses which ideas produce as they seek passage from person to person 
and from age to age’.  
Smith drew on his view of human nature as being social, which reinforced the importance of 
discourse. In his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith developed Hume’s notion of sympathy to 
capture the application of the imagination to social relations. Individuals use their 
imagination to try to understand a situation or an argument from the point of view of different 
participants, including an imaginary impartial observer. The notion of sympathy is central to 
rhetoric, in that successful communication, including persuasion, requires some 
understanding of the person or persons to whom an argument is addressed. Rational argument 
itself is insufficient to demonstrate the worth of an argument; the persuader needs to appeal to 
sentiment.  
Keynes was an avid reader and collector of Hume’s writings, and indeed was responsible, 
with Sraffa, for publishing Hume’s Abstract of A Teatise of Human Nature from one of the 
few remaining original copies (Hume, 1740). Before he came to economics, Keynes had been 
grappling with the problem of induction as posed by Hume (Keynes, 1973a) in order to work 
out a satisfactory theory of rational belief as the basis for action. Keynes early on put to one 
side areas where rationality alone provided demonstrative proof, and attempted to take 
Hume’s project further by exploring the basis for judgmenet in the absence of demonstrative 
proof. By positing an organicist ontology, particularly for social systems, Keynes implied that 
the domain of demonstrative proof , even in quantified probabilistic terms, was very limited 
(see Carabelli, 1995). Most knowledge is held with uncertainty, as reflected in the inverse of 
the degree of confidence held in any degree of belief. Keynes used the concept of weight to 
capture confidence in any degree of belief, where weight reflected the relative availability of 
relevant evidence. Of course, what constitutes relevant evidence itself is a matter of belief; as 
Hume argued, we have no way of demonstrably pinning down real causal powers (see Dow, 
1995). 
The limited scope of rational argument, and a Humean theory of human nature, are most 
clearly expressed by Keynes in his essay ‘My Early Beliefs’ (Keynes, 1972b). Here Keynes 
provided an account of how he realised the ‘thinness and superficiality, as well as the falsity’ 
of the theory of human nature embedded in Russell and Moore’s emphasis on rationality 
(Keynes, 1972b, 449). ‘The attribution of rationality to human nature, instead of enriching it, 
now seems to me to have impoverished it. It ignored certain powerful and valuable springs of 
feeling.’ (Keynes, 1972b, 448). Since rational argument is insufficient, it follows that the 
rhetoric by which an argument is presented is important. Keynes discusses the use of rhetoric 
to appeal to intuition: 
‘It is, I think, a further illustration of the appalling state of scholasticism into which 
the minds of so many economists have got which allows them to take leave of their 
intuitions altogether. Yet in writing economics one is not writing either a 
mathematical proof or a legal document. One is trying to arouse and appeal to the 
reader’s intuitions, and if he has worked himself into a state when he has none, one is 
helpless!’ (Keynes, 1979 XXIX, 150-1) 
Keynes, unlike Smith, did not focus in a sustained way on rhetoric. Yet there are many 
passages in his writing in economics where he reveals the view that rhetoric is important (see 
Dow, 1988). For example: 
‘In economics you cannot convict your opponent of error; you can only convince him 
of it. And even if you are right, you cannot convince him, if there is a defect in your 
own powers of persuasion and exposition or if his head is already so filled with 
contrary notions that he cannot catch the clues to your thought which you are trying to 
throw to him.’ (Keynes, 1973, XIII, 470) 
In this section, the argument has been developed that both Smith and Keynes saw rhetoric as 
inherent to theorising and its communication because of their Humean theory of human 
nature which, along with reason, provides the basis for science. Formal language is only one 
means of communication and is in general insufficient for persuasion. In the next section we 
proceed to consider what Smith and Keynes had to say about the form of rhetoric. 
 
FORM OF RHETORIC 
Smith (1762-63) outlined four types of rhetoric, although there is some dispute about how 
separable they are in practice (see Howell, 1975). McCloskey’s work for example explores 
the different elements of economist’s rhetoric, which draw on all four forms. The narrative 
form describes facts with a view to instruction; by connecting facts by time and place, the 
narrator can convey the idea of causal connection to aid understanding of the subject-matter. 
Poetic rhetoric seeks to entertain. Didactic rhetoric seeks conviction through instruction, 
while oratorical rhetoric aims to persuade. 
Didactic rhetoric is put forward as the means of communicating scientific results to a learned 
audience. Conviction is sought by means of presenting both sides of an argument fairly, in the 
hope that the audience will share the presenter’s side of the argument. Smith expounds two 
methods of didactic rhetoric: the Cartesian, or Newtonian, method and the Aristotelian 
method. The former entails argument from first principles, while the latter entails a separate 
chain of reasoning for each argument without developing connecting principles. Smith argues 
that the former method is the more convincing. This follows from his theory of human nature, 
which seeks aesthetic pleasure from theories: 
‘It gives us a pleasure to see the phaenomena which we reckoned the most 
unaccountable as deduced from some principle (commonly a wellknown one) and all 
united in one chain.....We need not be surprised then that the Cartesian 
Philosophy....tho it does not perhaps contain a word of truth....should nevertheless 
have been so universally received by all the Learned in Europe at that time. The Great 
Superiority of the method over that of Aristotle....made them greedily receive a work 
which we justly esteem one of the most entertaining Romances that has ever been 
wrote.’ (Smith, 1783; 1983, 146) 
Thus, while Smith himself rejected Cartesian philosophy, he could understand its 
psychological appeal. He himself also sought to present a system when he turned to economic 
questions, seeking to identify some first principles (such as the division of labour) on which 
to base his analysis. But this system differed from the Cartesian in that it had an empirical 
foundation, and was open (see Skinner, 1972). Smith’s historical method emphasised the 
variety of ways in which societies evolved, and the impossibility of pinning down true causal 
forces, both of which required open-system analysis.  
Oratorical rhetoric seeks to persuade by magnifying the preferred side of the argument and 
concealing the alternative. The particular form of persuasion depends on the nature of the 
audience, in particular the degree of sympathy between speaker and audience, and the general 
context of the presentation, such as current economic conditions. Smith points to two 
traditions in style of oratorical argument: the Socratic and the Aristotelian. The former 
method involves attempting to win over the audience by means of indirect argument, so that 
the audience is brought round to share the speaker’s conclusions in an unexpected manner. 
Smith favoured the Aristotelian method, which involved a direct statement of the argument 
and the use of a plain style. This approach accorded better with Smith’s theory of human 
nature (and common sense philosophy) which emphasised the appeal of familiarity: 
‘...we observe, in  general, that no system, how well soever in other respects 
supported, has ever been able to gain any general credit in the world, whose 
connecting principles were not such as were familiar to all mankind.’ (Smith, 1795; 
1980, 46) 
Keynes did not develop a theory of rhetoric as such. But he developed a theory of logic which 
differed from the Classical logic of formal analysis. This has been called variously ‘ordinary 
logic’ (see Carabelli, 1988) and ‘human logic’ (see Winslow, 1986). This logic refers to 
argument in situations where classical logic is inadequate, notably situations where 
knowledge is held with uncertainty. Here appeal is made to sentiment, to convention, and to 
imagination (or intuition). As to the particular form in which ordinary logic is expressed, 
Keynes showed himself continually aware of the importance of sympathy, or its lack. In the 
Preface to his Essays in Persuasion, for example, Keynes (1972b, xvii) notes ‘I was 
constantly on my guard - as I well remember looking back - to be as moderate as my 
convictions and the argument would permit’. Carabelli (1988, 163) refers to Keynes’s ‘latent 
rhetorical bent’ based on his view that beliefs could be changed. Keynes shared the Scottish 
Enlightenment view of the purpose of knowledge as being to effect change. 
Keynes, like Smith, attempted to build up a theoretical system, but one which was open and 
thus not amenable to capture in a system of simultaneous equations. He sought historical 
empirical regularities, like the relation between consumption and income, and a theory of 
human nature under uncertainty, on which to build his system. The formal system itself was 
simple, and was presented in direct fashion with reference to real entities (such as the beauty 
contest example). But in many ways Keynes failed to persuade. This may be explained partly 
by his unwillingness to close his system (thus violating the principle of aesthetic appeal) and 
partly by the oratorical form of rhetoric he employed both in the academic and policy arenas 
which came to be regarded (see Lucas, 1980) as falling short of scientific rationality as 
conventionally understood. 
We turn now to consider to particular features of Smith and Keynes’s views on rationality and 
rhetoric: the role of analogy, and the role of rationalisation. 
 
THE ROLE OF ANALOGY 
A common rhetorical devise is the use of analogy. This devise potentially has particular force, 
given Smith’s view that arguments are most persuasive when they can be couched in terms of 
familiar principles; the implication is that arguments are persuasive when presented along 
with analogues familiar to the audience. But we need to distinguish between positive analogy 
and negative analogy. 
Again we start with Hume. Sutherland (1982) has suggested that an objection to the 
inappropriate use of positive analogy was common to Scottish Enlightenment thought and 
was central to Hume’s philosophy. The objection was to the use of analogy between different 
realms. In Hume’s case, he objected to arguments about the nature and existence of God 
couched in terms of an analogy with the human realm. According to Hume, then, God’s 
existence was a matter for belief, not for rational demonstration. Similarly, Hume argued 
against the analogy between sensation and reality; again, according to Hume, the connection 
could only be made by belief or sentiment, not rational demonstration. While persuasive, 
therefore, the use of positive analogy was potentially dangerous. 
Hume did however use the notion of negative analogy, again in a way which stemmed from 
his epistemology. Reality is complex, but for science to proceed we need to categorise. These 
categories can be established by negative analogy. Hume used the example of eggs. No two 
eggs are the same. But repeated observation of eggs reveals sufficient sameness to allow us to 
form the category ‘eggs’. In spite of our inability by reason to identify true causal forces, we 
can use categorisation to form working hypotheses. This approach underpinned Hume’s 
theory of human nature, his working hypothesis being that there is a common element of 
humanity. But these hypotheses carry the potential for surprising counter-examples in the 
future. 
Smith (1776) similarly employed negative analogy in his historical analysis, arguing for 
example that the division of labour operated in a wide variety of circumstances and taking a 
wide variety of forms. The motivation was the one he outlined in the History of Astronomy, 
namely the search for connecting principles in a simple chain of reasoning. But Smith also 
employed positive analogy, particularly to convey the meaning of his economic system. Thus 
the Invisible Hand is an analogy to convey the meaning of a system with unintended 
consequences which are socially beneficial. Similarly, Smith used the analogy of a machine: 
‘Systems in many respects resemble machines. A machine is a little system, created to 
perform, as well as to connect together, in reality, those different movements and 
effects which the artist has occasion for. A system is an imaginary machine invented 
to connect together in the fancy those different movements and effects which are 
already in reality performed.’  (Smith, 1795; 1980, 66) 
These are positive analogies within the realm of ideas. But Smith also used positive analogy 
in his construction of the theory of human nature implying that individuals themselves 
employ positive analogy. The very notion of sympathy itself may be thought of as entailing 
analogy. The imagination is employed to construct an analogy between the observer, the 
actor, the person acted against, and the impartial observer.  
Keynes too employed both negative and positive analogy. As with Hume, Keynes saw a 
solution to the problem of induction as lying in negative analogy. While the positive 
relationship between consumption and income, for example, could not be proved 
demonstratively, nevertheless, observed regularity between consumption and income in spite 
of observed structural changes added weight to the hypothesised relationship. Keynes 
employed positive analogy as a rhetorical device in order to convey meaning to, and persuade, 
readers. The success of this device is evident from the the continued familiarity of economists 
with the analogy of the widow’s cruse, or the beauty contest. But Keynes was careful not to 
employ positive analogy between theory and reality. He was conscious of the epistemological 
gulf between ideas and reality, as exemplified in his description of economics: 
Economics is a science of thinking in terms of models joined to the art of choosing 
models which are relevant to the contemporary world. It is compelled to be this, 
because, unlike the typical natural science, the material to which it is applied is, in too 
many respects, not homogeneous through time. (Keynes, 1973c, 296-97) 
Rather than thinking of theorising in Smith and Keynes in terms of analogy, since this would 
involve inadmissable analogy between ideas and the real, it is perhaps better to think in terms 
of rationalisation. We explore this concept in the next section. 
 
RATIONALISATION IN ECONOMICS  
The word rationalisation implies the notion of rational reconstruction of something which is 
not itself rational (otherwise the rational account is identical to the rationalisation). It is 
therefore a useful concept to employ for Smith and Keynes, who both saw reality as founded 
in human nature which is governed by both sentiment and reason, and who saw knowledge 
likewise as combining sentiment and reason. Both therefore saw individuals in the economy, 
and also theorists about their behaviour, as engaged in rationalisation.  
Taking first actual human behaviour, there are circumstances where social pressure requires 
action to be justified by reason (although both Smith and Keynes saw such justification as 
being in general impossible). Thus Smith’s learned audience requires a didactic form of 
rhetoric. Similarly, Keynes’s boardrooms require a formalist presentation of the justification 
to invest, even though rationality alone could never justify long-term investment. Thus, in 
chapter 11 of the General Theory, Keynes sets out the official discourse for the investment 
decision in terms of a comparison between the marginal efficiency of investment and the rate 
of interest, while in chapter 12 he provides the actual account of decision-making under 
uncertainty (see Dow, 1991). 
Nor need we presume that such rationalisation is consciously recognised as a means of 
handling the inadequacy of reason. Both Smith and Keynes explicitly pojnted to the human 
capacity for self-deception. Smith (1759, 181) for example remarked on the self-deception 
that riches bring happiness which drives the entrepreneurial spirit. Self-deception in this case 
is welcome as an engine for growth. Keynes, like Marx, noted a similar tendency in the 
particular form of the illusion that the accumulation of monetary wealth creates happiness. 
Winslow (1995) focuses on this observation of Keynes and his analysis of it as irrational 
behaviour. 
Theory can also be understood as rationalisation, given the limited scope for pure reason. 
Theory abstracts from observation of a complex reality in order to identify regularities which 
suggest connecting principles. If, as we have argued, the economic system itself cannot be 
purely rational (because behaviour requires additional guides for action), then any abstraction 
which suggests connecting principles must necessarily entail rationalisation. Only if theory 
abstracts by representing a separable aspect of reality can it be more than a rationaisation, and 
this is only possible if economic behaviour is purely rational. The role of theory thus rests on 
our access or otherwise to evidence of causal processes, and on our theory of human nature. 
The same applies at all levels of ideas. Thus methodologists, in studying economists’ 
theorising, are rationalising that process (unless it too is fully rational). 
The question then arises as to the application of theory-as-rationalisation. If theory is directly 
applied to policy questions, an analogy has been implied between the rationalisation and the 
reality. The purist position would be to abstain from policy prescription. Yet this is clearly 
unacceptable at the level of human action. If a manager cannot rationally justify an 
investment, or an entrepreneur cannot rationally justify the expectation of wealth and 
happiness, then should they abstain from action? As both Hume and Keynes explicitly 
pointed out, rationality is an insufficient guide to action, the gap being taken up by 
judgement, sentiment, convention etc. The same would seem to apply to economists. 
But is that the last word, that economists should rely on judgement, sentiment and 
convention? This seems to imply the conclusion of McCloskey’s work, that she who 
persuades wins the argument. But, if we approach the question from a Humean perspective, 
we give primacy to other bases for action than pure reason, and devote them to particular 
study. The first step, which most economists avoid, is to specify the sentiments underpinning 
their theories. Only once these are known can a meaningful discourse proceed on the relative 
merits of theories and their applicability to particular circumstances. One thing the rhetoric 
approach has brought to the surface has been the tremendous interest in interviews with 
economists which reveal their sentiments (as sparked off by Klamer, 1983). 
 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter has been to discuss the centrality of rhetoric to economics which 
follows directly from the limitations on rationality. Because of the nature of social systems, 
and of human nature, as outlined by Smith and Keynes (under the influence of Hume), 
economic theory as a rational system cannot represent reality. By abstracting connecting 
principles within an open theoretical system, theory can at best only achieve a rationalisation 
of reality. Further, if reality itself is understood as an open system, then decision-making in 
the economy itself must often be based on rationalisation, when it is not explicitly based on 
sentiment. 
The language in which economic theory is expressed therefore is important, since rationality 
is insufficient for economists just as for economic agents. If, as Smith and Keynes argued, 
sentiment, judgement and convention are necessary adjuncts to pure reason, then it is 
important how these are conveyed rhetorically. Most significant for economics is that its 
official discourse denies a role for these factors, so that there is a disjunction between that 
discourse and the unofficial discourse which actually persuades. 
For Smith and Keynes, the purpose of the study of economics was to provide a good basis for 
policy action. The success of the ideas they put forward depended on their persuasiveness. In 
other words, the purpose of rhetoric itself was to effect change, in the minds of other 
economists and among policy makers. 
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